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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio l
(decided October 19, 2006)
"Ten faith-based social service organizations" affiliated with
the Roman Catholic Church and the Baptist Bible Fellowship Interna-
tional challenged the validity of the Women's Health and Wellness
Act ("WHWA"), an act designed to promote greater equality in
access to healthcare.2 The plaintiffs argued that the WHWA violated
religious rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution3 and the
New York State Constitution.4 Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought to
enjoin the State Superintendent of Insurance from enforcing the
WHWA.5 The state contended that "while the Legislature might have
made another choice in balancing those two interests, it could not say
that its choice was an unreasonable interference with petitioners' ex-
1 Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio (Serio I1), 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y.
2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 97 (2007).
2 Women's Health and Wellness Act of 2002, N.Y. Legis. Memo 554 (McKinney 2000);
Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 462-63.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I states, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ...."; Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
4 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3 states, in pertinent part:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed in this
state to all humankind ... but the liberty of conscience hereby secured
shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify
practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state.
5 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 463.
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ercise of their religion.",6  The Supreme Court of Albany County
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint, and upheld the WHWA as constitutional.7 The
plaintiffs appealed, and a divided appellate division affirmed.8 The
plaintiffs then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which af-
firmed, holding the WHWA was constitutional. 9
The WHWA requires expanded insurance coverage for wom-
en's health services, including mammograms, cervical cytology, bone
density screening, and contraception.10 The statute provides an ex-
emption for "religious employers."'" This exemption permits "a reli-
gious employer ... [to] request a contract without coverage for fed-
eral food and drug administration approved contraceptive methods
that are contrary to the religious employer's religious tenets. 1 2 An
employer must provide contraception coverage in its health care plan
if it does not meet the "religious employer" exemption. 13 Individual
employees of religious employers, however, may obtain contracep-
tion coverage through purchasing an insurance rider "at the prevail-
ing small group community rate."1 4 The plaintiffs argued that this
exemption is too narrow, and thus violates their right to free exercise
6 Respondent's Brief in Opposition for a Writ of Certiorari at 20, Serio II, 128 S. Ct. 97
(No. 06-1550), 2007 WL 2174220.
7 Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio (Serio 1), 808 N.Y.S.2d 447, 452-53
(App. Div. 3d Dep't 2006).
8 Id. at 474 (Cardona, P.J., dissenting) ("[A] statute drafted in such an 'all or nothing'
manner is not narrowly tailored so as to expand benefit coverage to women and is, in our
view, unconstitutional.").
9 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 463, 469.
10 Id. at461.
" See N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 3221(16)(A)(1), 4303(cc)(1)(A) (McKinney 2007).
12 Id. §§ 3221(16)(A)(1), 4303(cc)(1).
13 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 468.
14 N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 3221(16)(B)(i)(A), 4303(cc)(1)(2)(A).
226 [Vol. 24
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of religion because it forces them to facilitate employee conduct they
deem morally reprehensible and adverse to core religious beliefs.15
This argument underscores the problem with mandatory cov-
erage for prescription contraception: allowing all FDA-approved
contraception coverage in a health care plan may interfere with the
religious beliefs of employers opposed to abortion or contraception.
16
Further, the legislature contemplated a broader "conscience clause"
to include more religious employers, but the majority favored the nar-
rower definition at issue here.
17
The plaintiffs' main contention concerned the definition of
"religious employer." The plaintiffs argued the definition distin-
guishing between organizations that are exempt from the statute and
those that are not was too narrow.18 Of the ten plaintiffs, eight are af-
filiated with the Roman Catholic Church. 19 Three are associated with
"5 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 462, 463.
16 Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts to Define Religion: The Ramifications of Applying
Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to Religious Employers, 28 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 741, 751-52 (2005). Professor Stabile explains that the Catholic Church's
moral opposition to mandatory prescription contraceptive coverage extends beyond birth
control, given that FDA-approved prescription contraception includes abortifacients, such as
the "moming-after" pill. Id.
"7 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 462. See Edward T. Mechmann, Illusion or Protection? Free
Exercise Rights and Laws Mandating Insurance Coverage of Contraception, 41 CATH. LAW.
145 (2001).
It should be stressed that the failure to grant conscience protection means
that thousands of Catholics will be forced to pay for medicines and pro-
cedures they find morally repugnant, and that priests and bishops will be
forced by state law to directly support conduct that they would otherwise
seek to oppose or correct in their preaching, teaching and sacramental
activity.
Id. at 158. See also, John Caher, Panel Finds Constitutional Women's Health Care Act, 235
N.Y. L.J. 1 (2006) ("A far broader 'conscience clause' that would have permitted religious
employers much more leeway was specifically rejected by the New York Legislature in a bill
that underwent many revisions and was enacted as an election-year compromise.").
18 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 462.
19 Id. at 462-63.
2008]
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large entities that provide immigrant resettlement programs, afforda-
ble housing, job development services, and domestic violence shel-
ters; three operate healthcare facilities, including hospice centers,
nursing homes, and rehabilitative facilities; the other two operate pri-
vate schools.20  The remaining two plaintiffs are affiliated with the
Baptist Bible Fellowship International; one plaintiff offers social ser-
vices, including prison ministry, crisis pregnancy centers, job place-
ment, and homeless services; the other is involved in an organization
that operates a K-12 school, providing day-care, preschool, and youth
services. 21  All ten plaintiffs conceded they do not qualify as "reli-
gious employer[s]" under the WHWA because they employ people of
other faiths and provide social services outside of their ministerial
functions.22 Further, only three of the plaintiffs qualify for federal tax
exemption under the relevant IRS statute.23
The New York Court of Appeals determined the WHWA was
constitutional as applied to the plaintiffs.24 The court applied the
United States Supreme Court's tests for upholding the Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses, as well as its own standard in assessing
the WHWA against the free exercise clause of the New York State
Constitution. 25 Furthermore, the court held the plaintiffs had the bur-
20 Id.
21 Id. at 463.
22 Id.
23 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 463; 26 U.S.C.A. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) (West 2007) provides, in
relevant part: [The entities exempt from filing tax returns under 26 U.S.C.A § 501(a) are]:
"churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches."
24 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 463.
25 Id. ("Plaintiffs' strongest claim is under the New York Free Exercise Clause .. .
228 [Vol. 24
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den to meet these tests.26
To show the WHWA violates the Free Exercise Clause of the
Federal Constitution, the plaintiffs had to establish the statutes at is-
sue were not "valid and neutral law[s] of general applicability.,
27
The Court of Appeals followed the Supreme Court's definition of
neutrality, explaining that a law is neutral if it "does not 'target[] reli-
gious beliefs as such' or have as its 'object ... to infringe upon or re-
strict practices because of their religious motivation.' ,28 The court
found the Supreme Court's neutrality test subject to several excep-
tions, such as compelling state interests, 29 having other constitutional
protections in addition to freedom of religion, 30 and preserving
church autonomy.31
First, the court reasoned the plaintiffs had not met their bur-
26 Id. at 467.
27 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring).
In Lee, the Court held a federal statute requiring an Amish employer to pay Social Security
tax did not violate the employer's right to free exercise of religion because it is in society's
best interest to uniformly apply the tax law. Id. at 254, 260.
28 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 464 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hia-
leah, 508 U.S. 520, 527, 533, 542 (1993)) (alteration in original) (holding a city resolution
opposing ritual animal sacrifice violated the plaintiffs' right to exercise their belief in Sante-
ria since the text of the ordinances were gerrymandered to include most secular animal kil-
lings).
29 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 464-65 (quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881,
888 (1990)). In Smith, two plaintiffs were fired based on their religiously-motivated use of
Peyote. Smith, 494 U.S. at 874. The termination was held constitutional by the Supreme
Court because the state's interest in not opening every civic obligation to religious exemp-
tion was compelling. Id. at 890.
30 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 465. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst'l Rights, Inc.,
547 U.S. 47, 64 (2006) (holding that military recruitment at a law school is not unconstitu-
tional because it does not interfere with the law school's right to communicate and speak
freely).
31 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 465. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese. v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696, 709-10 (1976) (holding states should be prohibited from interfering with church
governance since it violates a Church's First Amendment rights); Presbyterian Church v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969) (stating
ecclesiastical questions are matters for state determination in civil disputes).
5
Marx: Court of Appeals of New York - Catholic Charities of the Diocese
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2008
TOURO LA WREVIEW
den respecting the state's interest, given the WHWA's purpose was
to provide broad contraception coverage to women in New York.32
The court appeared concerned that "[t]o hold that any religious ex-
emption that is not all-inclusive renders a statute non-neutral would
be to discourage the enactment of any such exemptions-and thus to
restrict, rather than promote, freedom of religion. 33
Next, the court assessed the "hybrid rights" exception-an
exception to the neutrality requirement when other constitutional
rights, in addition to the free exercise of religion, are allegedly in-
fringed.34 The court stated, "this is not a case that involves free exer-
cise 'in conjunction with other constitutional protections,' ,35 reason-
ing "[t]he legislation does not interfere with plaintiffs' right to
communicate, or to refrain from communicating, any message they
like. 36 The court did, however, acknowledge the WHWA created a
burden on free exercise, though to an extent insufficient to strike
down the statute.37
The last exception to the constitutional neutrality doctrine
analyzed by the court was church autonomy, "which prevents states
32 Serio 11, 859 N.E.2d at 464.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 464-65.
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections,
such as freedom of speech and of the press, or the rights of parents ... to
direct the education of their children.
Id. (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 881).
" Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 465 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 881).
36 Id.
31 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 465 ("[The WHWA] does burden their exercise of religion-but
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from interfering in matters of internal church governance."38  The
court found this exception inapplicable to the plaintiffs here, because
church autonomy was not at issue.39
The court separately analyzed the claim that the WHWA vi-
olated the free exercise clause of the New York State Constitution.4"
The court balanced the free exercise burden created by the statute
against the interest it advances, giving "substantial deference" to the
legislature.41 This test is two-fold and fact sensitive.42 First, a plain-
tiff must show "a sincerely held religious belief' effected by the sta-
tute's requirement.43 Second, the state must demonstrate the statute
"serves a compelling governmental purpose" and that granting "an
exemption [to the plaintiff] would substantially impede fulfillment of
that goal." 44 The Catholic Charities court stressed the amount of de-
ference afforded to the legislature and explained "the party claiming
an exemption bears the burden of showing that the challenged legisla-
tion . . . is an unreasonable interference with religious freedom.,
45
The New York test is designed to provide greater religious constitu-
tional protection than Employment Division v. Smith.46
The court refused to interpret the New York free exercise
38 Id. (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709-10; Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of
Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 107-08 (1952)).
39 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 465 ("The legislature has not attempted through the WHWA to
'lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.'"
(quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 877)).
40 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3.
41 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 466-67.
42 Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420, 426 (N.Y. 1989).
43 Id.
44 Id. (citations omitted).
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clause as requiring strict scrutiny review for religious exemption re-
quests, reasoning "the WHWA does not literally compel them [the
plaintiffs] to purchase contraceptive coverage for their employees, in
violation of their religious beliefs; it only requires that policies that
provide prescription drug coverage include coverage for contracep-
tives., 47  The court appeared to reach this conclusion by noting the
statute does not force anyone to provide drug coverage benefits.48 In
rejecting strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard, the New York
Court of Appeals stressed the need to heed legislative decisions and
promote efficient governmental operations.49 Further, the appellate
division's decision in Serio I, affirmed by the Court of Appeals in Se-
rio II, noted "[o]nly in the context of prison administration has the
Court of Appeals articulated a quantum required of the state's inter-
est, and [even] then it has required that the state show only a 'legiti-
mate' institutional interest to outweigh state constitutional free exer-
cise claims. 5 °
After balancing the respect for the plaintiffs' religious beliefs
against the state's interest in establishing better and more equal
healthcare for women, the court held the WHWA did not violate New
York's free exercise clause. 5' The court supported its holding by
47 Id. at 468 (emphasis in original).
48 Id.; Serio I, 808 N.Y.S.2d at 474 (Cardona, P.J., dissenting) ("It is the fact that their op-
position is so public and widespread which makes the Catholic plaintiffs, in particular, more
susceptible to charges of hypocrisy, especially since ... these plaintiffs could avoid support-
ing contraceptive use by choosing not to provide any prescription coverage to their em-
ployees."). But see Stabile, supra note 16, at 751-52 (arguing Catholic institutions will not
be as competitive with other employers who provide better health coverage if they choose to
not follow the coverage mandate by refusing to provide health insurance to their employees).
49 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 467.
50 Serio I, 808 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
5' Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 468.
232 [Vol. 24
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finding the legislature carefully considered extensive evidence, in-
cluding a study showing women in New York paid sixty-eight per-
cent more than men for out-of-pocket healthcare expenses, mostly
due to reproductive healthcare.52
The appellate division, in Serio I, also examined the plain-
tiffs' claims under the Federal Constitution's Establishment Clause.53
The Serio I court did not analyze the New York State Constitution's
Establishment Clause because the plaintiffs did not assert a violation
on that ground. The appellate division applied the infamous three-
part Lemon test: the statute must (1) "have a secular legislative pur-
pose"; (2) not advance or inhibit religion; and (3) not "foster an ex-
cessive government entanglement with religion.,
54
The appellate division held the WHWA did not violate the
Federal Establishment Clause.55  That court reasoned that the
WHWA's four criteria for an exemption were "facially objective"
and noted that a government official was not vested with the discre-
tion to distinguish between religious and secular organizations.56 The
court held that a distinction "not between denominations, but between
52 Id. at 462.
53 The Serio I court did not analyze the New York State Constitution's Establishment
Clause because the plaintiffs did not assert a violation on that ground. Serio I, 808 N.Y.S.2d
at 461 n.7 ("[T]he Establishment Clause is applicable to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment." (citing Roemer v. Bd. Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 744 nn.6, 7 (1976))).
54 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See, e.g., Corp. for the Presiding
Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336-39 (1987). In Amos, a statute providing state aid to
church-related elementary and secondary schools did not create excessive entanglement be-
tween church and state. The Court found the level of state inspection and evaluation of
funding, teachers, materials, and curriculum was found constitutional because the entity's
ability to spread its religion was not any greater-the statute was neutral on its face-and
thus it did not foster an impermissible entanglement between church and state.
5' Serio I, 808 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
56 Id. at 463.
2008]
9
Marx: Court of Appeals of New York - Catholic Charities of the Diocese
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2008
TOURO LA WREVIEW [Vol. 24
religious organizations based on the nature of their activities" does
not violate the Constitution.57 Further, "[i]t cannot be convincingly
argued that the WHWA was designed to favor or disfavor Catholics,
Baptists or any other religion .... [The statute is] generally applica-
ble and neutral between religions."'5 8
Under the Federal Constitution, courts look to whether or not
a statute meets the neutrality and general applicability test articulated
in Sherbert v. Verner,59 or an exception to strict scrutiny.articulated in
Smith,6 ° while New York courts apply a balancing test in analyzing a
statute under the State Constitution, as articulated in La Rocca v.
Lane.61  The Court of Appeals' analysis of the constitutional issues
surrounding the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause shows how
the New York State Constitution allows for a broader interpretation
Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 468-69 (citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 249-51 (1982))
(holding a state act allowing for exemption of religious organization that received more than
half of total contributions from members or affiliated organizations was not unconstitutional
as applied to the plaintiffs, given a sufficient governmental interest in regulating charitable
contributions from the public).
8 Id. at 468.
374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963) (invalidating a statute despite the existence of a "compel-
ling state interest" where that interest specifically discriminates against a particular religion
and where there is a strong connection between the state interest and the abuse, and the
abuse is grave and not merely attenuated in relation to the state interest).
60 See Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil is in the Details: Neutral, Generally Applicable
Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045 (2000).
The determination of whether the Sherbert exception is triggered
proceeds in two steps. The first focuses on whether a law contains a me-
chanism similar to the "good cause" criterion in that it is open to unfet-
tered discretionary interpretation. If such a mechanism exists, the
second step requires courts to determine whether it is enforced in a dis-
criminatory manner. Absent evidence of discrimination in the actual en-
forcement of the regulation, the Sherbert exception is not triggered, and
there is no need to apply the compelling state interest test.
Id. at 1081.
61 338 N.E.2d 606, 613 (N.Y. 1975) ("The respective interests must be balanced to deter-
mine whether the incidental burdening is justified."). See People v. Woodruff, 272 N.Y.S.2d
786, 789 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1966).
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of the free exercise of religion than the Federal Constitution.62
In analyzing these different interpretations of the Free Exer-
cise Clause, it is instructive to first examine the nature of the consti-
tutional doctrine articulated by the United States Supreme Court. In
Sherbert, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state unemploy-
ment compensation law because it was neutral and generally applica-
ble. 63 Under Smith, a state must show a compelling interest to over-
come a law that is not neutral and generally applicable. 64 However, it
was not until Lukumi that the Supreme Court gave clear guidance on
the meaning of neutrality and general applicability. In analyzing neu-
trality, three questions must be asked: (1) is the law facially targeting
religion?; 65 (2) is the law's object or purpose discriminatory?; 66 and
(3) is the operation or effect of the law discriminatory?
67
[I]t is [also] possible to discern a set of questions that
should be addressed as part of the general applicability
62 See Letter from John D. Mumane to Serphin R. Maltese, New York State Senator (Feb.
15, 2002), in N.Y. Bill Jacket, 2002 Assemb. B. 11723, ch. 554 ("The New York Court of
Appeals has maintained that the state constitution guarantees a higher level of individual
rights than the federal constitution.").
63 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 409-10.
64 Kaplan, supra note 61, at 1074 (holding unconstitutional laws that are neither neutral
nor generally applicable, or laws containing "a system of individualized exemptions," absent
a state showing of"a compelling reason for burdening an individual's religious freedom").
65 Kaplan, supra note 61, at 1077. See also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533 (explaining laws lack
"facial neutrality if [they] refer[] to a religious practice without a secular meaning discerni-
ble from the language or context.").
66 Kaplan, supra note 61, at 1077. See also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 534 ("Official action that
targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance
with the requirement of facial neutrality."); id. at 540 ("Relevant evidence [of legislative ob-
ject] includes, among other things, the historical background of the decision under challenge,
the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the
legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by mem-
bers of the decisionmaking body." (citing Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68 (1977))).
67 Kaplan, supra note 61, at 1077. See also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 535 ("Apart from the
text, the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object.").
11
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inquiry, which focuses on the actual operation and ef-
fect of a law. First, is the law designed to achieve a
general or a specific purpose? ... [Second,] is the law
constructed so that in its actual operation it targets on-
ly religious conduct or singles out a particular reli-
gion?
68
The combined effect of the five-step neutrality
and general applicability inquiries is to identify inten-
tionally discriminatory laws, whether they do their
work overtly or covertly, that impose a burden on
plaintiffs because of their religion. When laws are
found to fail this prong of the Smith test, they are au-
tomatically subjected to strict scrutiny. However, if
the laws pass muster under this prong of Smith, the in-
quiry shifts to the second prong, which considers
whether or not the challenged law falls within the
69Sherbert exception.
In Smith, the Court upheld the constitutionality of an Oregon
law prohibiting the knowing and intentional possession of a con-
trolled substance. Although the plaintiffs were were fired from their
jobs for using peyote, in accordance to their Native American beliefs,
the Court reasoned, "The government's ability to enforce generally
applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct . . . 'cannot de-
pend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious
objector's spiritual development.' ,70
State Employment Relations Board v. Christ the King Region-
68 Kaplan, supra note 61, at 1078-79.
69 Kaplan, supra note 61, at 1080 (emphasis added).
70 Smith, 494 U.S. at 874, 885 (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Prot. Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 451 (1988)).
236 [Vol. 24
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al High School,71 in contrast, involved a challenge to a law granting
the New York State Employment Relations Board the right to compel
parties to negotiate in good faith. 72 The New York Court of Appeals
held the law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment, reasoning that although the Roman Catholic secondary
school compelled the board, pursuant to the challenged law, to bar-
gain in good faith with the Lay Faculty Association, it only did so in
an effort to improve labor relations.73 The plaintiff challenged the
law as infringing upon its right to free exercise of religion.74 In
upholding the law, the court explained the "mere potentiality for
transgression" in the Employment Relations Board's supervision over
collective bargaining was insufficient to claim its authority under the
law infringed on the plaintiffs right to free exercise or establishment
of religion.75
In La Rocca v. Lane, the New York Court of Appeals upheld
the constitutionality of a criminal court judge's decision to prohibit a
Roman Catholic priest from wearing his clerical garb while defend-
ing a client at trial.76 The court reasoned that a criminal court's obli-
gation to ensure a fair trial for the defendant and the People out-
weighed the plaintiffs interest in exercising his right to wear the
ceremonial religious clothing of his faith.77 The court considered the
following factors:
7" 682 N.E.2d 960 (N.Y. 1997).
72 State Employment Relations Board, 682 N.E.2d at 962-63.
71 Id. at 963-64.
74 Id. at 963.
71 Id. at 965-67.
76 338 N.E.2d at 608, 613.
77 La Rocca, 338 N.E.2d at 613.
20081 237
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The gravity of the harm which would be
caused by an excess of power .... whether the excess
of power can be adequately corrected on appeal or by
other ordinary proceedings at law or in equity....
If an adequate remedy is available, the burden-
ing of judicial process with collateral proceedings, in-
terruptive of the orderly administration of justice,
would be unjustified. If, however, appeal or other
proceedings would be inadequate to prevent the harm,
and prohibition would furnish a more complete and ef-
ficacious remedy, it may be used even though other
methods of redress are technically available.78
Moreover, it is important to analyze these precedents in light
of the cannon of constitutional avoidance, which requires a court to
avoid passing on a constitutional issue if some other means of reach-
ing a decision are available. 79 Notably, the Court of Appeals is more
reluctant to rule on the constitutionality of a statute without the plain-
tiff satisfying a high burden of proof, as opposed to a plaintiff in a
case before the Supreme Court, who has already met a high burden of
proof for the Supreme Court to have heard the issue.8" For example,
in Ware, the Court of Appeals was reluctant to declare a state educa-
tion statute, mandating AIDS awareness education for elementary
-and high school students, unconstitutional because genuine issues of
material fact precluded summary judgment. More specifically, the
78 Id. at 610 (internal citations omitted).
79 See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concur-
ring).
80 See Scheiber v. St. John's Univ., 638 N.E.2d 977, 979-80 (N.Y. 1994) (holding that
where there are disputed issues of fact as to whether or not a religiously-exempt university
was lawful or discriminatory in exercising its preference to not keep plaintiff as its Vice
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state failed to show the plaintiffs, in comparison to the Amish, were
an isolated religious community because the plaintiffs were actively
involved in community life. 1 Contrastingly, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,8 2
the Supreme Court held:
[T]he Amish in this case have convincingly demon-
strated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the inter-
relationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital
role that belief and daily conduct play in the continued
survival of the Old Order Amish communities and
their religious organization, and the hazards presented
by the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid
as to others.83
In addition, a statute enacted by California, the Women's
Contraceptive Equity Act84 ("WCEA"), also provides a helpful refer-
ence point in analyzing the WHWA's constitutionality. The WCEA
defines "religious employer" identically to the WHWA, and similarly
permits a "religious employer" to request an exemption from pre-
scription contraception coverage if it is "contrary to the religious em-
ployer's religious tenets. 85 Like Serio I and Serio II, a religiously-
81 Ware, 550 N.E.2d at 422, 423, 426, 430.
82 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
83 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235.
84 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b) (West 2007); CAL. INS. CODE §
10 123.196(d) (West Supp. 2007).
85 A "religious employer" is
an entity for which each of the following is true: (A) The inculcation of
religious values is the purpose of the entity; (B) The entity primarily em-
ploys persons who share the religious tenets of the entity; (C) The entity
serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the entity; (D)
The entity is a nonprofit organization as described in Section
6033(a)(2)(A) (i) or (iii), of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended.
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affiliated social organization challenged the constitutionality of this
California statute. 6
The plaintiff in Catholic Charities, Catholic Charities of Sac-
ramento, like the plaintiffs in Serio I and II, was a faith-based, Catho-
lic non-profit organization which provided social services to the
community such as food, clothing, and affordable housing.87 Catho-
lic Charities of Sacramento, like the Serio plaintiffs, also conceded it
did not meet the statutory definition of "religious employer" because
it too performed social services outside of its ministerial functions.88
Catholic Charities of Sacramento claimed the WCEA violated its
constitutional religious rights by creating an overly-narrow exemp-
tion for religious employers. 89 In another similarity between the three
cases, all of the Catholic Charities organizations sought a declaratory
judgment claiming the statutes violated the Free Exercise Clause and
Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution and their. re-
spective state constitutions, and an injunction against their enforce-
ment.90 The Supreme Court of California, after examining Sherbert
and its progeny, held strict scrutiny did not apply to striking down a
statute under the Free Exercise Clause.91
In Catholic Charities, the plaintiff had four theories explain-
ing why an exception to the general rule articulated in Smith ap-
86 Catholic Charities v. Super. Ct., 85 P.3d 67, 75-76 (Cal. 2004).
87 Id. at 75.
88 Id. at 75-76.
89 Id. at 84 ("That the exemption is not sufficiently broad to cover all organizations affi-
liated with the Catholic Church does not mean the exemption discriminates against the Cath-
olic Church.").
90 Id. at 76.
91 Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 88-89.
240 [Vol. 24
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plied.92 First, the plaintiff argued "the face of the statute demon-
strate[d] a lack of neutrality." Second, the plaintiff argued that given
the "WCEA's legislative history and practical effect ... the Legisla-
ture 'gerrymandered' the law to reach only Catholic employers.
93
Further, the plaintiff argued that strict scrutiny applied to the free ex-
ercise of religion under the California Constitution, and that the court
should interpret the state constitution in "the same way the United
States Supreme Court interpreted the [F]ederal Constitution's [F]ree
[E]xercise [C]lause in Sherbert."94  Third, the plaintiff argued the
"WCEA is underinclusive, and therefore not narrowly tailored, be-
cause it does not facilitate access to prescription contraceptives" to
women who fall into certain categories.95 Finally, the plaintiff argued
the WCEA failed strict scrutiny because it "is not narrowly tailored
[and] it is overinclusive .... [because] it applies to employers that do
not discriminate on the basis of gender ."96 Alternatively, the
plaintiff argued the WCEA failed rational basis review.97
The Supreme Court of California, like the New York Court of
Appeals, upheld the constitutionality of the exemption for religious
employers despite plaintiff's invocation of comparable Supreme
Court precedents. 98 The Catholic Charities court rejected those com-
parisons, indicating that Supreme Court jurisprudence reflected an
92 Id. at 82, 89.
9' Id. at 82.
94 Id. at 89.
9' Id. at 94.
96 Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 94.
9' Id. at 76, 94 (holding, regardless of its applicability to the plaintiffs, the exemption "ra-
tionally serves the legitimate interest of complying with the rule barring interference with the
relationship between a church and its ministers").
98 See id. at 83-84, 95.
2412008]
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opposite trend.
The high court has never prohibited statutory
references to religion for the purpose of accommodat-
ing religious practice. To the contrary, the court has
repeatedly indicated that "it is a permissible legislative
purpose to alleviate significant governmental interfe-
rence with the ability of religious organizations to de-
fine and carry out their religious missions."
99
Further, the Supreme Court of California held "[t]he law
treats some Catholic organizations more favorably than all other em-
ployers by exempting them; nonexempt Catholic organizations are
treated the same as all other employers."' 00  Lastly, the Catholic
Charities court held the WCEA was facially neutral toward religion;
the Act did not favor distribution and subsidization of contraceptives,
but sought to prevent health benefits discrimination. °0
The Supreme Court of California concluded that under Sher-
bert, the WCEA withstood strict scrutiny, but also held meeting this
test was not a prerequisite to upholding the law's constitutionality;
Serio II applied more of a balancing test. The Catholic Charities
court first analyzed the free exercise claim under the Smith standard,
concluding the plaintiff could only overcome the WCEA by demon-
strating an exception to the general rule that "a law that is neutral and
of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling gov-
ernment interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening
99 Id. at 83; Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 464 (quoting Amos, 483 U.S. at 335).
100 Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 87. However, this statement may raise concerns under
the Establishment Clause.
'o' Id. at 94.
242 [Vol. 24
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a particular religious practice."' 0 2  The court ruled that the WCEA
exemption was neutral and generally applicable because it only re-
ferred to religion and did not apply to one religion differently than
another. 10 3 Further, the court held the WCEA was not an attempt at
religious gerrymandering because it was sufficiently broad, especially
considering the exemption was added at the insistence of Catholic or-
ganizations. 0 4 The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument for a
hybrid rights exception, because the plaintiffs failed to assert a meri-
torious constitutional claim in addition to the free exercise of religion
claim.105
The Supreme Court of California stated that while the WCEA
meets the Sherbert strict scrutiny test, "[w]e do not hold that the state
free exercise clause requires courts to apply the Sherbert test . ..
[i]nstead... we leave that question for another day."'' 0 6 Thought the
Supreme Court of California did apply strict scrutiny, the dissent, like
the New York Court of Appeals, asserted that the Supreme Court of
California's analysis of the WCEA under strict scrutiny was inade-
quate.' O7 This comparison indicates that California may follow a sim-
102 Id. at 82 (quoting Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 531).
103 Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 83 ("[T]he burden arises not from the religious termi-
nology used in the exemption, but from the generally applicable requirement to provide cov-
erage for contraceptives. The high court has never prohibited statutory references to religion
for the purpose of accommodating religious practice.").
104 Id. at 84.
'o' Id. at 87-88.
106 Id. at 91, 94.
107 See id. at 105 (Brown, J., dissenting).
Strict scrutiny is not what it once was. Described in the past as "strict
in theory and fatal in fact," it has mellowed in recent decades.... If re-
cent precedent is any guide, a state's interest is compelling if the state
says it is. Thus, consistent with federal precedent compelling interest
now seems more or less coextensive with the state's asserted exercise of
20081
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ilar balancing test for determining the constitutionality of a statutory
religious employer exemption as New York.
The New York Court of Appeals, in Serio II, stated,
In interpreting our Free Exercise Clause we have not
applied, and we do not now adopt, the inflexible rule
of Smith that no person may complain of a burden on
religious exercise that is imposed by a generally appli-
cable, neutral statute. Rather, we have held that when
the State imposes "an incidental burden on the right to
free exercise of religion" we must consider the interest
advanced by the legislation that imposes the burden,
and that "[t]he respective interests must be balanced to
determine whether the incidental burdening is justi-
fied.",108
Despite technical differences in legal analysis, comparing and
contrasting California's case law respecting a statute similar to the
WHWA leads to the conclusion that New York will follow the more
liberal trend set forth in Catholic Charities of Sacramento, and Serio
I and II. One commentator reached a similar prediction in the midst
of the legislative and constitutional debate before these two decisions
were even rendered. 09
police power ....
Id. at 105. See also Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 467 ("Often... the courts rejected claims to reli-
gious exemptions, and it is questionable whether the scrutiny applied by those courts is real-
ly as strict as their statement of the rule implies.").
'0 Serio II, 859 N.E.2d at 466 (quoting La Rocca, 338 N.E.2d at 613).
109 Mechmann, supra note 17, at 167.
Even assuming that New York State courts would apply a broader stan-
dard under the state constitution ... there is no guarantee that litigation
to obtain a religious exemption will be successful. As a result, the
Church may be hard pressed to find a safe harbor for its religious beliefs
regarding the immorality of contraception, and may be faced with the
unpalatable choice of conforming to the values of society or finding oth-
er avenues to maintain its integrity.
[Vol. 24
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The Court of Appeals' conclusion of the constitutionality of
the WHWA is likely to remain a significant point of contention for
years to come. Those who believe in the sanctity of life feel the
WHWA creates a slippery slope on which their core beliefs are com-
promised. l l Further, religious organizations that choose not to fol-
low the insurance coverage mandate by not providing their em-
ployees with health insurance may be worse off than employers who
are able to provide their employees with competitive health care cov-
erage."1 However, a few commentators have pointed out religious
exemptions, such as the WHWA, stifle access to, and quality of,
healthcare available to women.'1 2 These commentators posit the re-
medy to this controversy is achieved by creative solutions which
compromise between those who value life and those who value
choice. 
1 3
In conclusion, when one balances moral objections to a con-
stitutionally neutral statute against the societal impact on cost and
access to healthcare,' 14 the Serio II court's decision to uphold the
110 Stabile, supra note 16, at 745 ("Regardless of one's own religion or one's personal
view of the Catholic Church's position on birth control, the state action here establishes a
dangerous precedent that fails to respect the integrity of religious institutions, threatening the
Church's autonomy and right of self-definition.").
111 See Stabile, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
112 Susan Berke Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Saving Roe is Not Enough: When Religion
Controls Healthcare, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 725 (2004). "While refusal clauses recognize
that certain medical procedures may be antithetical to the beliefs of some individual provid-
ers, broad-based refusal clauses also have the potential to significantly burden patients by
creating obstacles and absolute impediments to patients' ability to make their own health
care decisions." Id. at 727.
113 See id. at 747 (explaining how the "community model" adopted in California allows
for all forms of contraception, as well as sterilization, but permits neither abortions nor fertil-
ity treatments).
114 Sponsor's Memo, in N.Y. Bill Jacket, L. 2002, ch. 554 ("[I]n the NYC area, only 50%
of managed care plans cover the cost of contraceptives leaving a significant number of wom-
en to pay full price for what may be the only prescription that they will fill all year, despite
21
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constitutionality of a statute that seeks to balance access to health
care between the sexes, is easily understood."
5
Sarah Marx
their $3,000 per year health insurance premium.").
15 Division of the Budget, in N.Y. Bill Jacket, L. 2002, ch. 554 ("Allowing religious em-
ployers to exclude coverage for prescribed contraceptives, except for employees who need
contraceptives to treat a medical condition, and allowing employees to purchase this cover-
age themselves is an appropriate compromise."); Memo of Gregory V. Serio in N.Y. Bill
Jacket, L. 2002, ch. 554 states:
[T]he mandates included in this bill to provide coverage for services
such as bone density screening, contraceptives and expanded frequency
of mammography screenings will advance the overall health of women.
The early diagnosis and treatment of cancer and osteoporosis should
prove to be cost effective, result in more favorable outcomes and thus is
clearly in the best interest of the women of this State.
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